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In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations 
via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation.  The government controlled 
scarce  frequencies,  issuing  sharply  limited  use  rights.    Spillovers  were  said  to  be  otherwise 
endemic.  Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners 
perform an analogous function via the ―price system.‖  The government solution was inefficient 
unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. 
 
Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system.  His 
spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry 
interests, and ridiculed by policy makers.  Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license 
sales to commence.  Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and 
$52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic policy success.   
 
We examine Coase‘s seminal 1959 paper on two levels.  First, we note the importance of its 
analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption of 
positive  transaction  costs.    This  fundamental  insight  has  had  enormous  influence  within  the 
economics  profession,  yet  is  often  lost  in  current  analyses.  This  analytical  insight  had  its 
beginning  in  his  acclaimed  early  article  on  the  firm  (Coase  1937),  and  continued  into  his 
subsequent treatment of social cost (Coase 1960).  Second, we investigate why spectrum policies 
have stopped well short of the property rights regime that Coase advocated, considering rent-
seeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories challenging Coase‘s property framework. 
 
One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive bidding is now the default tool in wireless license 
awards.  By rule of thumb, about $17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted.  Not bad 
for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & 
Economics. 
   
                                                 
1   Paper for Markets, Firms, and Property Rights: A Celebration of the Research of Ronald Coase, Conference at 
the University of Chicago School of Law (Dec. 4-5, 2009).   Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Ronald  Coase  postulates  that  an  economist  who  ―is  able  to  postpone  by  a  week  a 
government program which wastes $100 million a year (what I consider a modest success) has, 
by his action, earned his salary for the whole of his life‖ (Coase 1975).  By symmetry, this 
standard applies when research brings a good law sooner.  On that basis, Ronald Coase‘s single 
paper, The Federal Communications Commission (―FCC‖) (Coase 1959), has created such a 
bountiful account balance as to safely capitalize the Economists‘ Bank of Karma for generations 
to come. 
 
  The FCC paper was written in the spirit of Adam Smith‘s WEALTH  OF NATIONS.  In 
arguing a public policy position, Coase brought fundamentally new insights – disruptive clarities 
-- to system dynamics. His meticulous reasoning was delivered in two healthy portions.  The first 
walked the reader through the argument for government planning as a solution to the so-called 
externality problem, ―externality‖ being a term not used by Coase in either the FCC paper or the 
1960  ―Social  Cost‖  paper  to  follow  (Coase  1960).
2  By  focusing,  rather,  on  how  ―harmful 
effects‖ were rationally evaluated in economic markets, the generality of the spillover problem 
was revealed.  Social costs (externalities) were not exceptional cases and central planning was 
not  a  zero-cost  default.
3  Governments and markets provide alternative forms of resource 
coordination; determining the socially efficient mix requires symmetric appraisals.  To posit 
government taxes or controls as the costless default solution invokes the Nirvana Fallacy 
(Demsetz 1969).    
 
  The  second  source  of  disruptive  clarity  consisted  of  Coase‘s  deconstruction  of  the 
government‘s logic to assign property rights by fiat.  Regulators and the U.S. Supreme Court had 
confused the resource allocation question – how airwaves were to be used – with the rights 
ownership question – who got to use them.  Licenses were assigned by comparative hearings 
(―beauty contests‖) on the grounds that chaos would reign in the airwaves were the rights sold 
like other economic goods.  Coase, observing licenses traded in secondary markets, saw the 
creation of resource use rights and the assignment of said rights as separable.   
                                                 
2   Coase explicitly avoided ―externality‖ in his attempt to show the generality of the resource allocation problem, 
breaking loose from the Pigouvian paradigm  that characterized products  with spillovers as uniquely leading to 
market failure. He thereby focused on alternative solutions to the resource problem, their costs, benefits and the 
government‘s facilitative role in defining flexible spectrum rights whose particular utilization could be valued and 
revalued  in  response  to  changing  market  and  technological  developments.  Pigouvian  static  externality  and  its 
subsequent mathematical treatment consistently failed to motivate problem-solving processes that could answer the 
question of how and why government could implement regulations (or taxes) that would be efficient where markets 
failed.  See Coase (1988); Dahlman (1980). 
3   Coase was keen to note such asymmetries in the economics literature.  The object of his critique in the 1959 FCC 
paper (Coase 1959) and then in his 1960,  The Problem of Social Cost (Coase 1960), was A.C. Pigou‘s influential 
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Pigou 1920).  Coase‘s The Marginal Controversy (Coase 1946), found a similar 
‗zero cost for government policy‘ assumption embedded in the work of Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition 
(Hotelling 1929).  Hotelling led many economists, including Abba Lerner and Paul Samuelson, to postulate that 
declining average cost goods were efficiently produced under a regime extending subsidies to suppliers who could 
thereby recover fixed costs while pricing outputs at marginal cost.  Coase noted that the approach implied that the 
required information for classifying products (and technologies used to produce them) was freely available to the 
government, and that such subsidies (and the taxes required to fund them) would not distort market feedback loops 
revealing which projects to fund.   Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 3 
 
  Both lines of thought, institutional symmetry and the allocation-ownership dichotomy, 
would  figure  prominently  in  Coase‘s  seminal  1960  analysis,  generally  considered  the  most 
frequently cited research paper in the history of economics (Hazlett and Coase 2009, p. 1).  Here 
we ponder issues more specifically related to Coase‘s work on radio spectrum, organized by the 
two  general  strands  delineated.    In  the  first  we  evaluate  spectrum  policies  under  a  positive 
transaction costs framework
4 helping to clarify recent critiques of Coase‘s property rights policy 
proposal as either (a) difficult to implement, given the stochastic nature of radio signals, or (b) 
obsolete, by virtue of newer digital radio technologies that permit the use of smart wireless 
devices in ―spectrum commons.‖  Both attacks embed the Pigouvian asymmetry that the Coasean 
analysis exposed.   
 
  In this paper, however, we focus largely on the widely adopted policy reform promoted in 
the Coase paper of 1959: wireless license auctions.  When offered, the suggestion was treated 
with extreme hostility.  Regulators, policy makers, industry officials, and academic experts were 
of the opinion that Coase was ignorant of the technical characteristics of radio spectrum and 
incorrect as to his allegedly radical economic analysis.  Auctions would not only be bad policy, 
they would be impossible: airwaves were not susceptible to definition as property.   
 
  Coase‘s responses were sound, yet we need not rehash them.  Over 30 other countries 
have run the experiment.  On July 25, 1994, e.g., the Federal Communications Commission 
commenced Auction No. 1, selling ten Narrowband Personal Communications Services (N-PCS) 
licenses used for paging services.  Aggregate winning bids of $617 million were generated.  
While  N-PCS  failed  to  prove  profitable,
5  the  government captured significant revenues and 
moved to hold additional auctions.  In March 1995, 99 broadband personal communications 
services licenses (PCS) offering rights enabling competition with cellular operators were sold for 
$7 billion. Through 2008, 73 FCC auctions were held, 27,484 wireless licenses sold, and $52.6 
billion collected from winning bidders.
6  See Appendix 1.   
 
  Auctions are now a well-established license assignment tool.  ―[S]pectrum auctions in the 
US have been a great success,‖ (Scanlan 2001, p. 690) a viewpoint widely shared by economists 
(Milgrom 2004). Policy makers have been energetic in claiming credit for their implementation.  
Indeed, wireless auctions now constitute a textbook example of efficient regulatory reform.  That 
Coase persevered in his analytical enterprise when his work was questioned by all about him, is a 
tribute to his character, the quality of his thought, and the substance of the economic model on 
which he built.   
 
  Coase (1959) is far less famous a work than its elaboration in Coase (1960).  That paper 
was published pursuant to an invitation for a correction from JLE editors, who claimed that it 
erred in its treatment of externalities. But the editors of this JOURNAL were wrong; the Federal 
Communications Commission paper did not commit a ―very interesting error‖ (Coase 1993, p. 
250) but offered a lucid correction.  We focus on two aspects of that analysis here: 
                                                 
4   See Coase Theorem discussion below. 
5   Paging services had been profitable, but were about to be displaced by cellular services.   (Murray 2001). 
6   Statement by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, News Release, Federal Communications Commission (March 18, 
2009) and FCC website.  For a summary of FCC reported auction results, see Appendix 1. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 4 
 
   (1) Symmetric evaluation of resource appropriation rules.  Coase thought clearly about 
the economics of damaging spillovers: they were byproducts of valuable activities and, as such, 
were  productive  inputs  subject  to  the  same  cost-benefit  calculus  as  other  resources.  This 
understanding  led  Coase  to  view  legal  rules  not  as  palliatives  for  market  failures,  but  as 
mechanisms to discover trade-offs and achieve optimal outcomes.  As soon as this task is made 
clear,  and  the  complex  nature  of  the  changing  opportunities  realized,  it  is  apparent  that  a 
government-managed process is simply one alternative, while markets form the standard default 
in a modern economy.  The role of economic analysis was not to assume away the problem by 
the deus ex machina of no-cost public regulation, but to compare institutional options, apples-to-
apples.  This common sense was uncommon, and it exposed the theoretical weakness of an 
economic paradigm that proved market failure while assuming perfect governments. 
 
   (2) The public policy of auctioning radio frequency ownership rights.  This signature 
policy payoff of Coase‘s 1959 paper begs the query: what other scholarly article has helped 
trigger such enormous real-world changes? Competitive bidding for wireless license awards, a 
reform uniformly traced to Coase (1959), began in New Zealand in 1989, in the U.S. in 1994, 
and is now employed in dozens of countries. License assignments have proceeded as suggested, 
eliminating costly delays and inefficiencies.  Yet license auctions do not enable market allocation 
of radio spectrum, and may in fact exacerbate the artificial scarcity imposed by regulation.  U.S. 
policy has, in recent years, been stymied by policy retrogression, under-allocating bandwidth for 
mobile networks and rejecting liberal licenses in favor of ―re-regulation.‖  Some of the problem 
can  be  traced  to  Coase‘s  ―bundle  of  rights‖  property  agnosticism  (addressed  previously  by 
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith 2001), which now calls for amendment.  We modestly propose 
a Coase (1959) 2.0 Edition that incorporates fifty years of wireless market experience to extend 
the efficiencies of license auctions to spectrum markets.   
 
  Coasean Disruption may be just getting started.     
 
 
II.  TWO SYMMETRIES AND ONE EMPIRICALLY TESTABLE PRESUMPTION 
 
  Coase (1959) brought clarity to resource economics by exposing two asymmetries in the 
existing analysis, and then tucking these insights into the comfortable paradigm of Adam Smith‘s 
―invisible hand.‖  First, he revealed that cost ―externalities‖ were not special cases but standard 
economic  inputs  (or  outputs).    The  social  goal  is  not  to  eliminate  (maximize)  them  but  to 
maximize economic value.
7  Second, the challenges encountered in doing so were not, uniquely, 
market failures.  They were real-world problems confronted by government regulators or private 
owners.  To assert that markets broke down when they failed to optimally deploy resources was 
unhelpful; it said nothing about the relative success of some alternative set of rules.  Direct 
government regulation, tax/subsidy schemes, and private pro perty rights – including the many 
variants  of  each  –  were  to  be  empirically  evaluated  to  determine  the  best  methods  for 
                                                 
7  It should be noted that Pigou (1920) did not seek to categorically suppress spillovers, but to incrementally tax or 
subsidize allocation choices so as to force decision makers to rationally account for them.  But where Pigou saw 
certain types of markets as subject to special policy interventions due to ―externalities,‖ Coase brought clarity by 
showing how the allocation of ―harmful effects‖ (or ―beneficial effects‖) was just another resource use question.  Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 5 
maximizing net social output.  Third, Coase was not agnostic about where the analysis would 
trend. Coase anticipated that full, fair, well-informed evaluations would find that decentralized 
resource owners generally outperformed state diktat.  
 
  These insights profoundly influenced development of both theory and empirical research.  
Yet,  we  note  that  much  of  the  essential  wisdom  has  yet  to  permeate  ongoing  economic 
discussion, particularly in the policy realm in which the Coasean analysis began – radio spectrum 
allocation.  We address each of these contributions in this light. 
 
  a. Opportunity Costs of Reducing “Harmful Effects” 
 
  The U.S. Supreme Court argued in 1943 that, because ―there is a fixed natural limitation 
upon  the  number  of  stations  that  can  operate  without  interfering  with  one  another,‖
8  the 
government  was  virtually  forced  to  tightly  control  spectrum  use.  Without  such  central 
administration, endemic interference between stations would produce chaos, what a later Court 
would dub ―a cacophony of competing voices.‖
9   
 
  Coase confronted the Supreme Court‘s ―misunderstanding of the nature of the problem 
(Coase 1959, p. 14),‖ and made a remarkable discovery.  First, the limited nature of frequencies 
simply  suggested  a  scarcity  constraint.    Countless  other  scarce  resources  were  efficiently 
allocated by ―the price  system.‖
10   Second, whatever spectrum use rights  were assigned to 
wireless users could be assigned by auctions rather than fiat.  This was an idea proposed initially 
by University of Chicago Law student Leo Herzel in 1951, who suggested this approach not after 
studying  under  Milton  Friedman  or  Aaron  Director,  but  having  read  Abba  Lerner‘s  THE 
ECONOMICS OF CONTROL (1944) (Coase 1993, see also Herzel 1951).  He was a good student: 
selling rights  to  the highest  bidder was  a logical  way  for  a socialist  system to  theoretically 
rationalize distribution.  While then controversial, the proposition cannot be in dispute: today the 
FCC does precisely this.
11 
 
  Coase‘s third argument went much further.  The government mitigated conflicts between 
users by sharply limiting resource use – a regime that ―relies exclusively on regulation and in 
which private property and the pricing system play no part‖ (Coase 1959, p. 34) – but could 
potentially achieve the same objective far more efficiently.  However it initially defined resource 
use rights, it could allow users to recontract.  Rights holders would then generate gains from 
trade, reducing interference when neighboring frequency users paid them more than they gave 
up, either accepting higher levels of airwave congestion or using mitigation techniques of their 
own – improved technology, adjusted operations, or relocation.  In this manner, users would act 
like property owners, searching for ways to increase the value of their assets.  
 
                                                 
8   National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 219 U.S. 190 (1943), p. 213. 
9   Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
10  ―Land, labor and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation.‖  (Coase 1959, 
p. 14). 
11   The alert reader will note that the issue should not have been in dispute in 1959, either, as radio and television 
stations traded freely in the marketplace – licenses and all.  But such transactions did not appear to settle the matter, 
as witnessed by the experts‘ consensus denouncing the suggestion as hopelessly naïve. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 6 
One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear delimitation of 
rights on the basis of which the transfer and recombination of rights can take 
place through the market.  In the case of radio, it should be possible for someone 
who is granted the use of a frequency to arrange to share it with someone else, 
with  whatever adjustments  to  hours of operation, power, location and kind  of 
transmitter,  etc.,  as  may  be  mutually  agreed  upon;  or  when  the  right  initially 
acquired  is  the  shared  use  of  a  frequency  (and  in  certain  cases  the  FCC  has 
permitted only shared usage), it should not be made impossible for one user to 




  This angle led Coase to see that the ―externalities‖ were resource use conflicts entirely 
analogous  to  the  input  costs  that  firms  routinely  incurred  in  producing  valuable  goods  and 
services.  When clearly owned, they were rationally allocated.  What made them seem to be of a 
special  character  were  circumstances  making  private  ownership  ill-defined.
12  But  those 
circumstances were not automatically eliminated by state ownership, government regulation, or a 
tax and subsidy scheme.  Such approaches were just another way to deal with the same conflicts 
over alternative resource use.  The confusion was apparent in radio spectrum, where private 
ownership was said to be impossible – but where regulators allegedly averted potential chaos by 
issuing rules excluding most resource uses so that they could award protected, unobstructed use 
rights to lucky licensees.       
 
  Coase saw that such rights could be more efficiently and transparently distributed by 
auction.    But  that  was  a  very  limited  reform,  because  ―the  enforcement  of  such  detailed 
regulations for the operation of stations as are now imposed by the Federal Communications 
Commission would severely limit the extent to which the way the frequency was used could be 
determined by the forces of the market‖ (Coase 1959, p. 25).  If emission rights were broadened 
to  constitute  ownership  of  frequencies,  then  private  owners  could  deploy  new  technologies, 
services,  and  business  models,  make  deals  across  FCC-defined  borders,  adjust  to  changing 
circumstances, and remix combinations of factors – including spectral inputs -- to discover the 
optimal level  of interference.   In a dynamically changing world,  such efficiencies would  be 
continually updated. 
 
  Such owners would not eliminate spillovers but be motivated to discover the efficient 
levels and types.  Some owners would buy neighboring (or distant) rights to emit, others sell, all 
comparing costs to benefits in order to maximize the value of their slices.  The result would be a 
complex  balancing.    This  was  starkly  at  odds  with  the  prevailing  view  that  ―harmful 
interference‖ was destructive and would be endemic without pervasive regulatory management 
of radio use.  ―It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the radio industry should be 
to minimize interference.  But this would be wrong.  The aim should be to maximize output‖ 
(Coase 1959, p. 27).
 
 
  Over time, spectrum ownership rights for certain types of licenses did expand, coming to 
resemble private ownership of the bandwidth allocated to the FCC license.  For mobile wireless 
                                                 
12   Owners have, most essentially, the right to exclude others from appropriating their property.  When lines cannot 
be drawn to delineate borders, the effort to define rights suffers.   Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 7 
services, in particular, spectrum authorities in the U.S. and elsewhere have granted liberal rights 
that delegate the choice of technologies, services, and business models largely to the licensee.  
This regulatory reform has generated enormous value in assisting the efficient organization of 
markets  (Hazlett  2008).  The  problem  is  that  it  has  been  parsimoniously  applied,  allotting 
relatively little spectrum to liberal licenses, and continuing the use of the state property regime 
for allocations.  This provokes new challenges for economic policy, as discussed below.    
 
  b.  Institutional Symmetry, and the Incredible Lightness of Stigler’s “Coase Theorem” 
 
  What has come to be called the Coase Theorem, courtesy of George Stigler,
13 obscures 
the Coasean analyses of 1959 and 1960 and leads to hazardous analytical detours.
14  The 
Stiglerian version is that, with zero transaction costs, resources will  be efficiently deployed no 
matter which party is endowed with ownership rights.  This discussion, with these conditions, 
appears in Coase (1960) not as a ―theorem‖ but to critique the existing economic theory that 
assumed away information and transactions cost when actions were taken by the state.  Coase, 
noting that the assumptions employed produced no market (or non-market) failure, then focused 
on situations with positive transaction costs as the real analytical challenge.  Efficient liability 
rules would be found by comparing the more effective organizational rules when all costs were 
included.  
 
  Misplaced  reliance  on  the  zero  transaction  cost  assumption  obscures  Coase‘s  central 
message.  This diversion is of large consequence in that such a default position is easily toppled.   
The case for Pigouvian taxes or state property ownership is reconstituted via demonstration of 
―transaction costs.‖   
 
  This does great violence to Coase‘s analysis on multiple levels.  First, it implicitly takes 
―transaction costs‖ as a fixed feature of markets, exogenous from the legal rules or regulations 
imposed by the state.
15  This is clearly incorrect; the way property rights are defined has great 
bearing on how such rights can be productively used in the marketplace.
16  Second, when rights 
are defined and distributed by the state in ways that hamper efficiency, the resulting ―tragedy‖ is 
properly a non-market failure.  By refusing to undertake transactions that are, given their cost, 
not worth the benefits sought, private property owners make efficient choices (Demsetz 2003).  
What needs to be fixed is the legal structure. 
 
                                                 
13  ―This proposition, that when there are no transaction costs the assignments of legal rights have no effect on the 
allocation of resources among economic enterprises… I christened… the Coase Theorem.‖  (Stigler 1988, p. 77). 
14   This conclusion has been rendered by Ronald Coase (1988) himself. 
15   ―The exclusive use model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively 
high  and  transaction  costs  associated  with  market-based  negotiation  of  access  rights  are  relatively  low.  The 
commons model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively low and 
transaction costs are relatively high.‖  Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report 
(Nov.  15,  2002),  p.  5.    We  note  the  FCC‘s  confused  terminology,  referring  to  the  private  property  model  as 
―exclusive use,‖ when such bandwidth constitutes the most intensively shared frequency spaces in economic terms, 
and to unlicensed bands as ―commons,‖ when such frequencies are regulated by governance rules imposed by the 
FCC under administrative allocation.   
16   For instance, a tragedy of the anti-commons ensues when rights are defined in fragmented, overlapping contours 
that are prohibitively costly to reassemble.  See (Heller 2008). Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 8 
  Third,  Coase  (1959)  is  clear  in  its  focus  on  symmetric  comparison  of  the  (positive) 
transactions  costs  faced  by  government  in  parceling  out  limited  use  rights  for  wireless 
applications, on the one hand, and an alternative system in which private entities owned the 
frequencies.  Either set of decision makers (regulators v. owners) would have to make choices.  
 
  Coase saw, for example, that the allocation of a given block of frequencies for television 
broadcasting, to the exclusion of other services, was not pre-determined by engineering rules.
17  
It was a choice made by regulators that reflected their belief that the value obtained from this use 
of bandwidth exceeded the value of the excluded opportunities.  There were other ways to 
perform the same coordination.   
 
  It was not sufficient to merely posit a market failure to establish a case for administrative 
allocation.    One  had  to  consider  the  operational  eff ectiveness  of  one  system  against  the 
alternatives.  As sensible as the conclusion was, it was radical at the time.  An academic (and 
FCC Chief Economist), Dallas Smythe, dismissed market allocation as theoretically imperfect 
and therefore irrelevant.  Coase responded:   
 
Professor Smythe also argued that the use of market controls depends on ‗the 
economic  assumption  that  there  is  substantially  perfect  competition  in  the 
electronics field.‘ This is a somewhat extreme view.  An allocation scheme costs 
something to administer, will itself lead to a misallocation of resources, and may 
encourage  some  monopolistic  tendencies  –  all  of  which  might  well  make  us 
willing  to  tolerate  a  considerable  amount  of  imperfect  competition  before 
substituting an allocation scheme for market controls (Coase 1959, p. 16).
 
 
  Coase explained that there is no such thing as a free allocation system. The efficient 
social choice considered the disparate options, symmetrically.  That is not a result of the zero 
transaction cost assumption, but its opposite. 
 
  c.  The Market Efficiency Default 
 
  While  Coase  went  ―looking  for  results,‖
18  he  was  not  agnostic.    He  analyzed  radio 
spectrum in 1959 as Adam Smith had analyzed commodity markets in 1776. The ―invisible 
hand‖ had much to offer.  A CBS broadcast executive expressed surprise when asked at a 1958 
congressional hearing about the possibility that the ―avenues of the air‖ should be sold by the 
Government such that ―the taxpayer would be getting the proceeds‖ (Coase 1959, p. 17). Coase 
delights in quoting the broadcaster‘s response, ―[t]his is a new and novel concept,‖
19 offering the 
retort:  ―This  ‗novel  theory‘  (novel  with  Adam  Smith)  is,  of  course,  that  the  allocation  of 
                                                 
17   ―[I]t is not clear why we should have to rely on the Federal Communications Commission rather than the 
ordinary  pricing  mechanism  to  decide  whether  a  particular  frequency  should  be  used  by  the  police,  or  for  a 
radiotelephone, or for a taxi service, or for an oil company for geophysical exploration, or by a motion-picture 
company to keep in touch with its film stars or for a broadcasting station.  Indeed, the multiplicity of these varied 
uses would suggest that the advantages to be derived from relying on the pricing mechanism would be especially 
great in this case.‖  (Coase 1959, p. 16.).   
18   Interview with Thomas W. Hazlett, REASON (Jan. 1997). 
19   Ibid. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 9 
resources should be determined by the forces of the market rather than as a result of government 
decisions‖ (Coase 1959, p. 18).  
 
  Coase argued that the regulatory agency was unlikely to exhibit comparative advantage in 
allocating  bandwidth.    Competitive  markets  would  reveal  opportunity  costs  and  reward 
entrepreneurial  efforts  to  identify  potential  benefits  from  innovation,  improving  social 
coordination.  In this, Coase operated mainly from theory, not from his own detailed examination 
of alternative regulatory models.  With the liberalization of certain important wireless licenses 
over  the  past  half-century,  however,  the  evidence  is  overwhelming:  the  normative 
recommendation was largely correct (Hazlett 2008; Hazlett & Leo 2011).  
 
 
III.  THE INTELLECTUAL PIVOT FOR AUCTIONS 
 
  When  Ronald  Coase  began  his  investigation  of  public  policy  for  radio  spectrum, 
communications policy experts in the U.S. widely held that radio spectrum rights were optimally 
held  by  the  state:  markets  would  under-produce  ―public  interest‖  outputs.    Grounded  in  the 
genesis  of  spectrum  allocation  for  radio  broadcasting,  policy  makers  opposed  market-driven 
rights allocations because they would ―emasculate ‗socially desirable‘ censorship.‖
20  But many 
analysts  went  much  further,  asserting  that  spectrum  could  only  be  held  by  the  government.  
Property rights could not be auctioned because they could not be defined.  ―Rights to use the 
spectrum are not susceptible to legal enforcement as are private property rights‖ (Melody 1980, 
p.392).  Airwave spillovers led to economic externalities, which would destroy market allocation 
– that was the theory-driven story.  When Coase explained the actual problem as delimiting 
rights, which could be achieved using one set of rules or the other (public ownership v. private 
ownership), the response from academic and policy experts was emphatically negative. 
 
Invited to the FCC to testify about his novel approach to spectrum allocation in 1959, the 
first question posed was Commissioner Philip Cross‘ query:  ―Tell us, Professor, is this all a big 
joke?‖  (Coase  1993).    In  1962,  the  Rand  Corporation  commissioned  Coase  and  two  other 
economists to write a detailed proposal to implement the suggested policy regime. Rand then 
suppressed the 200-page report when the think tank was warned of its potentially explosive 
political implications.
21  In 1965, a Federal Communications Commission official explained why 
the response to Coase was so uniformly hostile: ―After the initial shock of rationally considering 
the use of the pricing  mechanism in  frequency allocations,  the virtually  unanimous  view of 
communications  specialists  would  be  that  the  multiplicity  of  users  both  national  and 
international…, the interference characteristics of radio with signals at relatively low energy 
levels  interfering  at  diverse  points  many  hundreds  of  miles  away…  and  the  hundreds  of 
thousands of licensees involved in addition to the many millions of consumers make the pricing 
mechanism unworkable for frequency allocation‖ (Goldin 1965, p. 168).  When, in the mid-
1970s, Coase‘s call for auctions was (finally) taken up by an FCC member, it was promptly 
                                                 
20   As economist Jora Minasian stated the argument against auctions (Minasian 1975, p. 268). 
21   The episode is explained in Coase (1998).  The 1962 paper was finally released by Rand in 1995 – one 
year after FCC auctions commenced. (Coase, Meckling and Minasian 1995).    Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 10 
ridiculed by two fellow Commissioners who announced that its adoption garnered the same odds 
―as those on the Easter Bunny in the Preakness.‖
22 
 
  The intense opposition to competitive bidding was curious to Coase.  The arguments 
were made that (1) radio emission rights could not be defined to be sold; (2) even if such rights 
could be traded, market assignments would under-supply public interest outputs like local news 
or educational programming.   But the first premise was demonstrably untrue, as the licenses that 
were assigned by regulators were routinely re-assigned by the price system; secondary market 
transactions  had been  revealing the  existence of substantial  rents  since the 1920s.   And the 
second seemed to Coase to clash with common sense.  The conditions placed on licensees could 
be imposed in a regime where licenses were distributed by auction, with rents (reduced by the 
expected costs of the embedded obligations) captured for the public.  The objection to market 
assignments seemed simply to be in error. 
 
   Here Coase missed the political dynamics.  One advantage of an auction regime is that it 
improves transparency, forcing regulators to state terms and conditions.  But policy makers and 
broadcasters  are  able  to  generate  mutual  gains  –  trading  rents  for  regulatory  influence  over 
content -- by incomplete revelation of terms.  
 
  Policy makers had good reasons to fear a loss of control over broadcasting were auctions 
to  be  implemented.  Assigning  rights  to  radio  and  television  stations  by  competitive  bidding 
rather than administrative fiat eliminated non-arms length transactions and thereby reduced the 
scope  for  ―regulation  by  raised  eyebrow‖  –  a  term  of  art  at  the  FCC.
23  The license was 
commonly referenced as a quid pro quo, with rents awarded to licensees in exchange for ―public 
interest‖ outputs (see e.g., Hazlett and Spitzer 2000).  In reality, the enumerated social benefits 
rarely materialized.  By the FCC‘s own admission, the ―public interest‖ programming gambit 
was  a  failure,  producing  a  ―vast  wasteland,‖  as  FCC  Chairman  Newton  Minow  famously 
described TV fare in 1961 (Minow 1964, p. 45-69).   In 1976, Commissioner Glen O. Robinson 
likened broadcast regulation to ―a charade—a wrestling match full of fake grunts and groans but 
signifying nothing‘‘ (Geller 1994, p. 15).  As economist Bruce Owen deduced from the empirical 
evidence, the FCC ―does not live up to its own theory of regulation‖ (Owen 1982, p. 36).
 
 
Yet the lack of productive outputs did not mean that the regime was not a success in 
achieving certain politically popular ends.  Evidence of that success was seen in the extreme 
hostility to auctions cited above, and in the fact that is was particularly concentrated among those 
who benefited the most from the exercise of power over assignments -- committees in Congress 
overseeing FCC operations.  While budget and appropriations committees had long sought to 
obtain  revenues  from  licenses,  the  respective  commerce  committees  (overseeing 
telecommunications regulation) blocked reform.  In Feb. 1987, Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH), a 
member  of  the  Senate  Commerce  Committee,  sprayed  cold  water  on  the  Federal 
                                                 
22  Broadcast Renewal Applicant, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 434 n.2 (1977) (Commissioners Hooks and Fogarty, separate 
statement).  See Robinson (1978, p. 243). 
23   The term, coined by Nixon -appointed FCC Chair Dean Burch, has been defined by federal courts this way:  
―Thus, licensee political or artistic expression is particularly vulnerable to the 'raised eyebrow' of the FCC; faced 
with the threat of economic injury, the licensee will choose in many cases to avoid controversial speech in order to 
forestall that injury. Examples of this process are legion.‖ Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 169 
U.S. App. D.C. 166, 515 F.2d 397 (1974) Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 11 
Communications  Commission  proposal  to  authorize  license  sales  because  it  ``will  aid 
monopolies…. You won't get anywhere with this, so why don't you go back to the drawing 
board?'' (Kwerel and Rosston, p. 258).   In May 1987, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Chair of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Communications, rebuffed a colleague, Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-FL), 
Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, telling him that an auction ―undercuts the fundamental 
tenet  in  communications  policy  that  the  airwaves  are  a  limited  public  resource  [and  it]  is 
inappropriate to sell such a resource to the highest bidder‖ (Kwerel and Rosston, p. 258).  The 
Chair  of  the  House  Commerce  Committee,  John  Dingell  (D-MI),  then  introduced  1989 
legislation with a section: ―PROHIBITION OF SPECTRUM AUCTION‖ (Kwerel and Rosston, p. 258).  
The bill was simply a blunt object waved in a threatening manner; the FCC had no statutory 
authority to conduct auctions. 
 
  Yet this political animosity was dissipating over time.  Broadcasting – the object of the 
―fundamental tenet in communications policy‖ – was being eclipsed in economic importance by 
emerging wireless telephone services.  In 1993, with U.S. policy for second generation (2G) 
services lagging, with a newly unified national government (the Democratic Party controlled 
both  the  Presidency  and  the  Congress  for  the  first  time  in  12  years),  with  the  transparent 
squandering of billions of dollars in rents in the 1984-89 cellular license lotteries as predicate, 
the system was primed for reform (Hazlett 1998).  Congress authorized auctions in the 1993 
budget, mandating that they be used to distribute PCS, but not broadcasting, licenses and gave 
the Federal Communications Commission a one-year deadline to initiate competitive bidding.
24 
 
The demonstration effect was powerful.  Once sales commenced, distributing licenses 
economically, the consensus of the communications experts was exposed and broken.
25  The 
burden shifted: what was to justify a system in which licenses were not assigned to high bidders?  
Moreover, the new flow of federal receipts shifted the political equilibrium.  Stalwart opponents 
of auctions now sought to take credit.  Pedestrians in Washington D.C. found it hazardous to 
inadvertently  stroll  between  a  television  news  crew  and  an  FCC  Chairman  brandishing  an 
auction  check  for  the  Treasury.
26  The  Commission  issued  notices  boasting  that  it  was  a 
government profit center.
27  While tantamount to a real estate agent assuming credit for the 
market value of the property sold, the claim did posse ss a germ of historical veracity: prior to 
                                                 
24   The process by which the FCC acted quickly to create an auction mechanism is described in Evan Kwerel‘s 
Preface to Milgrom (2004).  Dr. Kwerel, then and now a Senior Economist at the FCC, was the FCC official who led 
the agency‘s auction planning. 
25   Auction rules employed by the FCC were crafted on a strict timeline and reflected an understanding that initial 
auction outcomes were politically important.  Were haphazard procedures to produce confusion, legal challenges, or 
long delays, the backlash might well eliminate the reforms.  FCC staff, largely enthusiastic supporters of auctions, 
were influential in steering the Commission towards fairly simple auction formats, and to testing mechanisms prior 
to deployments.  While we will see that such cauti on was soon compromised by the bidder subsidies extended in 
Auction 5 (May 1996), it was crucial that the first four auctions ran smoothly, resulted in orderly license 
assignments (and wireless deployments), and collected over $8 billion for the Treasury.   See (Kwerel and Rosston 
2000); (Porter and Smith2006). 
26   Auction receipts go to the U.S. Treasury, not the FCC.  However, the FCC is allowed to claim a fraction of 
auction receipts to cover the cost of administering auctions.  This fraction is not large. 
27   After the March 1995 broadband PCS auction, the FCC ―blew up a huge check [of $7.7 billion] to give the 
President.  The picture ran in newspapers across the country. .. I told the press that the FCC had raised more money 
than its total budget for its 61-year history. We were, I said, the most profitable American business in terms of return 
on equity.‖ (Hundt 2000, p. 96) .  (Hundt was Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, 1993-97.) Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 12 
1994, the Government had squandered such rents in favor of ―beauty contests‖ and lotteries 
(Krewel and Felker 1985; Hazlett and Michaels 1993).   
   
Worse  for  democratic  institutions,  government  policy  makers  were  enmeshed  in  a 
fundamental conflict of interest, setting rules for electronic speech, including content regulations 
such as the ―equal time rule‖ (imposed by statute in 1927) and the ―fairness doctrine‖ (imposed 
by the FCC in 1949), while their electoral fortunes relied on the information supplied to the 
public by these media outlets.  Even in arms length oversight, regulators were constrained to 
evaluate licensees with regard to political considerations.  And not always were regulations arms 
length.  Texas Congressman Lyndon Johnson amassed a personal fortune by forming a political 
alliance with the chairman of the FCC, befriending staffers of the agency, and then manipulating 
regulatory decisions to land his wife under-priced ownership of TV and radio stations – a process 
called by one observer, ―government between friends‖ (Caro 1991, p. 94).  Later, when President 
of  the  United  States,  ―Johnson  would  summon the  appropriate  CBS  personnel  to  the White 
House to  complain  that CBS was  charging one of his  TV stations  too much for syndicated 
programming.‖  The problem was solved when CBS News President Frank Stanton ―told his 
staff to furnish the program to the station free‖ (Ray 1990, p. 41).  During the Nixon years, 
networks considered implicit threats of license renewal problems in response to purported media 
bias to be just another cost of doing business.
28  Coase, aware of the potential for such corruption 
and First Amendment compromise, argued for competitive bidding as an antidote (Coase 1965).    
 
  The policy regime switch exposed a fundamental fact: the use of auctions was not 
revolutionary.  Licenses that had been defined by policymakers before would continue to be 
defined, if governments so desired, in precisely the same manner.  The traditional license, a s 
allocated to television broadcasting, affords a right to operate a wireless business as strictly 
defined  by  the  license.    Transmission  technology,  business  models  (ad  supported,  not 
subscription), services (broadcast video, not two -way broadband), and ev en the location of 
transmitters were specified by regulators.  Indeed, for TV and many other services, it still is: 
―almost all spectrum licenses have restrictions that specify the particular use to which bandwidth 
must be put‖ (Faulhaber 2006, p. 262).  The auction reform formally leaves this regime intact. 
 
   
    
IV. EFFICIENCIES OF LICENSE AUCTIONS 
 
Assigning  wireless  licenses  by  competitive  bidding  has  markedly  improved  the 
administrative  process  wherein  spectrum  rights  are  awarded  to  licensees  (Cramton  2002).  
Efficiencies include private sector savings on lobbying activity associated with ―comparative 
hearings,‖ contests  to  establish  the ―public interest‖ bona fides  of rival  bidders  for licenses.  
                                                 
28    A Sept. 25, 1970 memo written by presidential aide Charles Colson to Nixon White House Press Secretary Herb 
Klein detailed meetings in New York City where Colson had recently visited the heads of all three commercial 
broadcasting networks, pressuring them to report on the Nixon Administration more favorably.  ―I had to break 
every meeting. The networks badly want to have these kinds of discussions which they said they had had with other 
Administrations but never with ours. They told me any time we had a complaint about slanted coverage for me to 
call them directly.  [CBS President Ed] Paley said that he would like to come down to Washington and spend time 
with me anytime that I wanted. M In short, they are very much afraid of us and are trying hard to prove they are 
‗good guys.‘"  Quoted in Bazelon (1975, p. 246). Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 13 
They are also an improvement over lotteries, authorized for use by the U.S. Congress in 1981 as 
a compromise (Congress not wanting to grant the Reagan Administration auction authority), 
which were curiously conducted under the fiction that those applying for random selection were 
actual  phone  companies.    Thousands  of  new  ―phone  companies‖  materialized,  on  paper, 
submitting  detailed  engineering  drawings  and  proof  of  operating  experience,  such  evidence 
purchased from consulting firms and technology suppliers at considerable cost.
29  This charade 
created such massive filings, with hundreds of thousands of applications submitted for 1,468 
cellular licenses (two issued in each of 734 franchise areas), that an FCC warehouse storing these 
documents collapsed.  Between $500 million and $1 billion was squandered in rent se eking 
waste (Hazlett and Michaels 1993).    
 
But the largest costs were borne by consumers, technology suppliers, and investors after 
the non-auctioned licenses were assigned.  Given U.S. regulators‘ penchant for issuing large 
numbers of geographically (and, often, spectrally) small licenses, extensive secondary market 
transactions were needed to assembly efficient spectrum blocks.  To serve a national marketplace 
with mobile wireless, e.g., operators have acquired literally thousands of licenses – more than 
50,000 FCC wireless licenses are today held by mobile carriers (of which there are just four 
national operators) (Hazlett 2003).  Such aggregations have been expensive; an estimated $190 
million on brokers‘ fees alone was spent in 1991 in cellular license deals.
30    
 
More deleteriously, it took years to collect assets, delaying and degrading services.
31   
The use of auctions in the primary market has speeded this process, reducing social expense.  
Paul Milgrom references the general set of transaction cost s involved in reconfiguring license 
rights in secondary markets in writing:   
 
The history of the US wireless telephone service offers direct evidence that the 
fragmented and inefficient initial distribution of rights was not quickly correctable 
by  market  transactions.    Despite  demands  from  consumers  for  nationwide 
networks and the demonstrated successes of similarly wide networks in Europe, 
such networks were slow to develop in the United States (Milgrom 2004, p. 20).  
 
Such post-assignment delays were likely mitigated with the use of auctions.  In the 
important PCS A, B auction, held from Dec. 1994 to March 1995, one firm  – Sprint – emerged 
with 29 of 51 licenses needed for complete national coverage using 30 MHz.  This yielded Sprint 
– a new mobile entrant -- direct access to 147 million potential subscribers (more than half U.S. 
population) (Gruber 2005, p. 238).   With roaming agreements, themselves easier to execute 
given the defragmentation of licenses elsewhere, Sprint began providing services by late 1995.  
This  foray,  along  with  additional  regional  network  consolidations  enabled  in  the  PCS  A/B 
                                                 
29   The forms verified that a group of investors could build and operate a cellular phone company, proof of which 
was purchased from actual telecommunications suppliers in exchange for contracts to provide such services 
(contingent on the lottery applicants being selected).   
30   Federal Communications Commission, FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, WT Docket No. 97-150  
(Oct. 9, 1997), 22.   
31  Total aggregation costs would include the services deterred due to delayed network buildouts, as w ell as 
negotiating costs incurred to deal with strategic hold-outs. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 14 
auction and the formation of Nextel,
32 disrupted the existing cellular duopoly imposed by virtual 
of the fact that just two FCC licenses had been issued in each local franchise area.  
 
The auction exposed the fact that mobile licenses were  complements; significant value 
was created when adjacent licenses were purchased by bidders.
33   Productive gains were 
possible via the assembly of efficient packages, eliminating uneconomic rights distributions.
34  
Of course, PCS licenses also enabled comp etitive entry, ending the cellular duopoly.  Large 
gains  to  consumers  ensued.  Wireless  carriers  undercut  terrestrial  long -distance  charges, 
encouraging substitution from fixed to mobile networks.  The key marketing innovation began in 




As seen in Figure 1, average revenue per minute fell from over 50 cents prior to the PCS 
auction to just 6.4 cents in 2007, a nominal reduction of 87% -- at least 70% below the pre-PCS 
trend.  Most of this sharp decline was achieved via a huge increase in minutes of use, encouraged 
by flat rate pricing (capped during peak calling times, unlimited off-peak). 
 




                                                 
32   Fleet Call was a wireless operator built on so-called taxi dispatch licenses, officially known as Specialized 
Mobile Radio (SMR) services.  An entrepreneurial former FCC lawyer, Morgan O‘Brien, purchased rights to many 
of  these  licenses,  allocated  800  MHz  and  900  MHz  spectrum  (very  near  cellular  frequencies)  and  obtained 
permission from the regulator in 1990 to replace analog systems with digital technologies.  In a lobbying coup for 
the upstart, the request (heavily opposed by incumbent cellular operators) was granted.  This enabled the firm, 
renamed Nextel, to operate on up to 15 MHz.  (See Hazlett 2001, p. 387-88.)  Nextel served 12 million subscribers 
before being sold to Sprint for $35 billion in 2005.   
33   See (Ausbel, et al. 1997); (Moreton and Spiller 1998).  
34   This was also seen in the substantial premium paid by bidders for the large regional licenses in Auction 66 (for 
Advanced Wireless Services licenses) in Sept. 2006.  See analysis below. 
35   Federal Communications Commission, CMRS Fifth Annual Report (2000). 
36   CTIA data. 






23.0¢ -> 6.4¢ = 72.0% 
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  Competitive bidding for licenses may have encouraged regulators to continue to divvy up 
airwave rights in highly fragmented parcels.  In 73 auctions conducted by the FCC from July 
1994 through November 2008, the Commission sold some 27,484 licenses.
37 This radical (and 
globally distinct) fragmentation of licenses has been partially mitigated by the implementation of 
auctions.
38 Blocks of spectrum rights have been more efficiently aggregated, invigorating retail 
competition.
39  Similar licenses have sold for similar prices, adjusting for timing and other 
financial differences, and for synergies between licenses (Ausbel, et. al. 1997; Moreton and 
Spiller 1998). 
 
  Revenues  generated by license auctions have  assumed both economic and political 
importance.    To  economists,  the  rents  transferred  to  governments  create  public  financing 
efficiencies.  Each dollar raised theoretically offsets another dollar which would have  – but for 
the  auction  receipts  –  been  raised  via  taxes  that  distort  market  behavior.  A  rule  of  thumb 
associates each dollar of public revenue via taxation with approximately 33¢ in (additional) lost 
social benefit (Klempter 2002, p. 179). Through 2008, some $52 billion had been collected by 
the U.S. Government for license sales, suggesting perhaps about $17 billion in economic welfare 
delivered via the public financing bonus.  
 
  Such gains dissipate, however, if the spectrum allocation system intentionally distorts 
wireless  markets  in  order  to  increase  bids.    There  is  a  sharp  conflict  between  government 
maximizing its auction revenue and assigning spectrum rights so as to enable wireless market 
efficiency.  Because license revenues are easily dominated by consumer surplus generated by the 
wireless  services  enabled  (Hazlett  and  Muñoz  2009),  it  is  penny-wise  and  pound  foolish  to 
restrict competition (or, equivalently, delay license sales) in order to goose up auction receipts.  




V. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE LICENSE AUCTION REGIME 
  
1.  Bidder Collusion 
 
FCC auction procedures initially gave bidders incentives to signal – and collude – by 
using  bids  that  detailed  what  markets  they  were  most  keenly  interested  in  winning.  
Communications were achieved by placing bids that used the last three decimal places to mark 
desired territory.  A bid of $36,000,326, say, would indicate a decided interest in the bidder 
winning License No. 326.  This bidding strategy was labeled the trailing digits play.  
 
To  eliminate  this  practice,  the  FCC  no  longer  allows  bidders  to  submit  their  own 
(custom) bid amounts; they must select from incremental bids specified by the FCC (Cramton 
and Schwartz 2002; Bajari and Yeo 2008).  Other methods employed by bidders may signal their 
intentions, however.  One of the most pervasive strategies, which has garnered attention in the 
                                                 
37   FCC website.  The number is slightly inflated by the re-auction of some licenses. 
38   Aggregation problems exacerbated by the lack of combination bidding are discussed below. 
39   Federal Communications Commission, FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, WT Docket No. 97-150  
(Oct. 9, 1997), 22. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 16 
economics literature, is that of jump bidding.  This strategy registers bids one or more increments 
above the prescribed minimum.  The approach is designed to signal the strength of the bidder, 
―scaring away‖ rivals contesting a license. It may also secure a license for which the bidder may 
not have the highest value, but where a higher bidder‘s valuation proves less than the winning 
bid plus the minimum increment.
40  Another strategy, euphemistically called  upping yourself, 
occurs when a bidder increases their own bid despite being the standing high bid on a license.  
Ordinarily, this is viewed as a patently irrational action in auction theory.  Yet, in FCC license 
auctions, it has been associated with the same signaling strategies as those associated with jump 
bidding.
41   
 
The strategy of retaliatory bidding entails placing bids on the licenses bid upon by rivals, 
restricting  the  rival‘s  ability  to  bid  on  the  licenses  the  bidder  actually  desires  to  win.    For 
example, if a bidder is interested in license A and another bidder is interested in licenses A and 
B, the first bidder can drive up the price of B, signaling that the second bidder should cease 
bidding  on  A.    Many  bidding  strategies  have  emerged,  and  a  host  of  FCC  rules  on  bidder 
eligibility and withdrawal have been adopted in response.  Insofar as collusive strategies arise, 
they stem from regulator‘s provision of full information on bidder identities, bids submitted, and 
other information (Banks et al. 2002), making a case for not providing such information in these 
types of open auctions.  Beginning in 2008 (Auction 73) the FCC adopted anonymous bidding, 
revealing only the number of bidders who place bids for each license and the amount of the 
current  highest  bid.
42  Such  non-disclosure rules have benefits but also costs, in that firm 
executives are bound by extensive FCC regulations regarding inter -firm communications, rules 
adopted to protect the secrecy of bidder identities.  
 
While  many  of  the  flaws  in  the  FCC  rules  we re  anticipated  by  the  experimental 
economics literature it appears many of the flaws are fixable and have been fixed. ―A close 
examination of the problems experienced in the US in the middle of the 1990s, however, shows 
that they were relatively minor glitches to a very successful program of spectrum assignment‖ 
(Scanlan  2001,  p.  690).    That  is  the  mainstream  view,  and  it  garners  justifiable  support.  
However,  as  we  will  argue  below,  one  major  change  in  the  auction  format,  combinatorial 
bidding, should be implemented. 
 
2. Bidding Credits for Designated Entities 
 
In the 1993 legislation authorizing auctions, Congress mandated that the FCC conduct its 
competitive bidding procedures so as to fully include ―designated entities‖ (DEs).  These were 
defined as four types of companies: small businesses, rural telephone carriers, minority-owned 
firms,  female-owned  firms.    Due  to  a  U.S.  Supreme  Court  case  sharply  limiting  the  use  of 
government preferences assigned on the basis of race or gender,
43 the FCC dropped the latter two 
categories.  Small businesses and rural carriers, as defined by the Commission, would be eligible 
                                                 
40 Jump bidding is also used to ensure that one‘s bid is not tied, in which case, one of the tied bids is randomly 
selected to be the provisionally winning bid, and the others are discarded.  
41 There is a potential strategic reason for jump bidding called ―notch bidding‖ in which a bidder will jump to 
foreclose a bidder whose value is less than the current bid plus the minimum increment (Isaac et al. 2005). 
42  Details of the basic FCC auction design are discussed in Porter and Smith (2006). 
43   Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 17 
for favorable treatment to effectively subsidize their bidding as per a policy crafted in 1995.
44  
The rationale was that these companies were handica pped in accessing capital markets; in an 
open auction without such government protection, larger firms would out -bid them.  Both 
bidding credits were extended, and license set-asides (barring bids from non-DEs) were imposed 
to remedy this situation. 
 
This was not well thought out.  Put yourself in the position of a bidder who could use 
credits (other peoples‘ money) to supplement whatever would have been your cash bid. The 
bidding  credits  induced  over-bidding  in  auctions,  producing  winning  bids  much  higher  than 
those registered for similar licenses awarded without DE credits.  That the bidding credits were 
extended as low-interest long-term loans exacerbated the effect; bids net of the credits were far 
above the non-subsidized bids in previous PCS auctions.  The ensuing defaults and bankruptcies 
that occurred were a direct product of the fact that the firms granted such credits were neither 
efficient service providers nor, therefore, strong bidders.  By encouraging awards to inefficient 
firms, the main purpose of the auction was thwarted.  And it fails to incorporate the salient fact 
that, by sacrificing up front auction revenue in favor of efficiency, increases (in service markets) 
wealth creation, and much greater downstream government tax revenue will be captured.  
 
 This  reveals  the  severe  tension  between  auctions  and  preferences.    When  a  ―small 
business‖ is afforded a bidding credit, it attracts more intense bidding, wiping out the advantage 
afforded.  This outcome was virtually assured by the designation ―small business,‖ and the rules 
that  the  FCC  used  to  define  such  entities:  firms  with  limited  financial  resources  (including 
collateral).  This approach was explicitly taken to help firms that would otherwise have difficulty 
obtaining credit in order to bid for licenses.  But the reason that firms without financial standing 
have limited access to capital markets is that such firms are relatively bad bets. 
 
In the 1996 PCS C block auction (No. 5), the FCC saw winning bids more than twice as 
high, net of bidding credits, as had been paid in the (unsubsidized PCS A and B) auction the year 
before.
45  DE bidders extended 40% bidding credits.  (In other words, if a DE bids 100, that bid 
is registered as 140 in the auction but, were the DE bidder to win, would p ay just 100.)   And 
DEs were allowed to pay winning bids over ten years, interest -only for the first four, at an 
interest rate equal to that on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds (then about 6.5%).  This constituted 
a considerable financing subsidy for firms‘ whose cost of capital would have been about 14% 
(Hazlett and Boliek 1999).   
 
Moreover, it created a lucrative financial option.  Bidders could bid aggressively to win, 
make their first interest-only payment, then see whether license value exceeded what they had 
bid.  If so, they would finance their network, build-out, and then pay the government.  If not, 
they could declare bankruptcy and seek protection from their creditor – the federal government.  
Indeed, they could ask a bankruptcy court to reduce their obligation.  That is what the largest C 
                                                 
44   Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act – Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report and Order, 9 
FCC Rcd 5532, ¶ 115 (1994). 
45   The DE set-asides and bidding credits are explained in Federal Communications Commission,  In the Matter of 
Eligibility Restrictions on C Block Licenses in the Broadband Personal Communication Services, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, RM-11019 (rel. Oct. 15, 2004), par. 2. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 18 
block winners did (Hazlett and Boliek 1999).
46  GWI bid about $1.1 billion for licenses, but 
received permission from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court to satisfy its debt by paying just $200 million.  
Nextwave, having emerged the largest PCS C winner in 1996 with $4.8 billion in licenses, ended 




By exacerbating the winner‘s curse, and driving licenses to inefficient suppliers, the FCC 
destroyed  huge  increments  of  consumer  welfare.    PCS  spectrum  was  allocated  in  1989-94.  
Auction 5 (concluded May 1996) assigned C licenses and Auction 11 (concluded January 1997) 
assigned F licenses.  It then took until settlements and transactions conducted in 2004 and FCC 
Auction 58 (concluded February 2005) to assign most C and F block license rights to operators.  
This deprived the mobile market of about 30 MHz of nationwide bandwidth, raising prices to 
retail customers.  The loss in efficiency of this input truncation amounted to at least $65 billion 
(Hazlett and Muñoz 2009).  
 
The irony was that some economists had greeted aspects of the bidding credits program 
enthusiastically, on the grounds that it would increase net auction receipts.  By subsidizing rivals 
to established incumbent carriers, such carriers would be forced to bid more aggressively.  The 
designated entities would not emerge victorious but serve as bidding shills used by ―the house‖ 
to drive up the stakes of the game (Ayers and Cramton 1996).   The analysis implicitly assumed 
that the government could calibrate the credits to perfectly strike a balance, driving up receipts 
without  awarding  licenses  to  sub-standard  service  suppliers.    Prescience  is  an  ambitious 
assumption  for  public  policy.    When  violated,  weak  bidders  actually  win  licenses,  perform 
relatively  poorly,  and  reduce  consumer  welfare.    This  is  what  happened  endemically  and 
sensationally in the PCS-C and PCS-F block auctions, as described, resulting in extremely large 
social losses.  While the FCC no longer extends credit to winning bidders, it continues to favor 
weak bidders with bidding credits, raising the probability that productive efficiencies will be lost 
and output markets will exhibit degraded performance (Ayers and Cramton 1996).
 
 
3.  License Fragmentation and the Lack of Package Bids 
 
  License fragmentation continues to unnecessarily complicate bidding strategies, exposing 
bidders attempting to create regional or national coverage areas to higher levels of risk than need 
be the case.  The efficiency of property rights assignments is therein reduced.  It also leads to 
relatively  lengthy  auctions  that,  combined  with  FCC  non-disclosure  rules,  deter  auction 
participation -- perversely reducing competitive network entry.   
 
U.S. spectrum policy is unique in its reliance on extreme license fragmentation.  Virtually 
all countries issue national licenses for mobile telephone service; a few countries issue large 
regional licenses.  
 
In economic terms, the (easily) most important wireless market is for mobile phones.  
The FCC calls this Commercial Mobile Radio Services, or ―CMRS,‖ and it includes cellular, 
                                                 
46   PCS F block licenses auctioned in 1997 were also subject to the same subsidy rules. 
47   Federal Communications Commission, FCC Announces NextWave Settlement Agreement, Press Release (April 
20, 2004).  NextWave also returned some of its licenses to the FCC. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 19 
personal communications services (PCS), specialized mobile radio (SMR), advanced wireless 
services (AWS) and 700 MHz licenses.  The FCC created 734 local cellular franchise areas, 
issuing  two  duopoly  licenses  in  each.    In  PCS,  multiple  maps  were  used;  A  and  B  blocks 
consisted of 51 licenses nationwide; C, D, E and F of 493 licenses – 2,074 licenses in all. Today, 
including more than 47,000 SMR licenses (issued by local market and channel), there are at least 
53,774 licenses used by U.S. mobile carriers. The equilibrium number of licenses appears to be 
somewhere about four (meaning four combinations of thousands of elemental licenses), given 




The formats adopted for license auctions have reflected the ―fragmentation preferences‖ 
of  policy  makers.    Wireless  operators  bidding  on  licenses  generally  demand  regional  or 
nationwide  spectrum  inputs.    This  makes  licenses  complements.    On  the  other  hand,  the 
existence of alternative license types within the same auction presents chances for substitution.  
At a small cost penalty (in the added complexity in base station and handset radios), bidders can 
aggregate licenses across bands to achieve their geographic coverage goals. 
 
Taking this general spectrum allocation approach as a given, the economists who helped 
craft FCC auction rules saw that simple bidding formats  – such as sealed bids – would not 
produce  optimal  results.    Auctions  would  generate  both  greater  revenue  and  more  efficient 
results  (resources  going  to  the  most  efficient  operators)  were  values  of  complements  and 
substitutes revealed as bids were being formulated.  This led to the now familiar simultaneous 
ascending auction (SAA) format, also known as a sequential, multi-round auction (SMR).
49   
 
Inefficiencies yet arise, however, due to risks bidders face in assembling complementary 
sets of licenses.
50  The solution to this problem is to include package (combinatorial) bids.  The 
FCC rejected this path in 1994, because combinatorial auctions have been thought to face 
difficult computational issues, sometimes referred to by Michael Rothkopf as the  2
N bogeyman 
(Porter and Smith 2006).  Despite substantial improvements in auction software and numerous 
FCC announcements (dating to 2000
51) that it would adopt such methods,
52 the Commission has 
                                                 
48   Approximately 51,597 licenses were held by U.S. carriers in 2003, prior to the auction of 1,087 AWS licenses in 
Sept. 2006 and 1,090 700 MHz licenses in March 2008.  See Appendix 1 for a summary of U.S. license auctions. 
For the 2003 license distribution across regulatory categories, see Hazlett (2003), 193.  Note that SMR licenses were 
largely assigned by the FCC prior to the advent of auctions, and then reassembled in secondary markets.  
49   Porter and Smith (2006, p. 65-66).  See also Milgrom (2004). 
50   There is overwhelming  evidence  that  wireless licenses issued in different  geographic areas are  highly 
complementary.  The FCC has issued a remarkably high number of mobile services licenses, nearly 50,000, only to 
see market bidding (both in government  auctions and secondary market transactions) piece together four national 
networks (Hazlett 2003).  Moreover, networks are heavily biased in their acquisitions, aggregating particular 
spectrum blocks.  Nextel (now owned by Sprint) built its national network  exclusively with Specialized Mobile 
Radio (SMR) licenses, e.g., deploying 800 MHz and 900 MHz frequencies scarcely used by other carriers.  This 
reality has led regulators in virtually every other developed country to issue mobile services licenses with f ar larger 
footprints – almost always national, in fact – while maintaining rivalry between three and five carriers.      
51   Federal Communications Commission, Conference on Combinatorial Bidding (May 5 -7, 2000), agenda here: 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm? job=conference_agenda&y=2000.  
52   Ibid. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 20 
yet to widely deploy package bidding.
53  Indeed, the combinatorial clock auction discussed in 
Porter et al. (2003) has been shown to be highly efficient and does not needlessly suffer from  
computational complexity. 
 
  With such a mechanism, firms could bid for the set of licenses they desire.  Otherwise, 
they are forced to bid for each license individually, uncertain of the prices they will have to pay 
to obtain complementary assets.  This uncertainty is the source of ―aggregation risk‖ (Bykowsky 
et  al.  2000).  To  achieve  national  coverage,  a  new  entrant  must  bid  on  scores  of  properties 
without knowing how high prices will go.  Should the firm emerge as the high bidder on a 
number of licenses, but then see prices for complementary licenses climb higher than anticipated, 
it will be forced to make difficult choices.  Either it will exceed its budget, or attempt to exit the 
auction.  The problem with the latter is that there is no guarantee that it will be outbid on all 
licenses where it is currently the provisional winning bidder.  If it holds some fraction of its 
intended coverage map when the auction ends, it‘s best option may then be to liquidate at fire 
sale prices.   
 
  Rules to mitigate this effect—short of combinatorial auction forms that allow bidders to 
select packages in real time—appear to have backfired.  It has been shown that an FCC rule 
allowing bid withdrawals (with penalties), designed to lessen the impact of failed aggregations, 
actually  results  in  more  losses  when  licenses  have  strong  complementarities  (Porter  1999).  
Hence,  firms  can  easily  find  themselves  having  to  unload  holdings  at  fire  sale  prices  post-
auction, or upping bids to buy ‗fill-in‘ licenses at higher prices than it estimated to be profitable.  
Firms can avoid either position by simply choosing not to enter the auction in the first place 
(Bulow et al. 2009).
 
 
Hence,  aggregation  risk  diminishes  competitive  bidding,  lowering  revenues  and 
potentially  decreasing  efficiency  in  the  output  market.
54  One  indication  that  this  risk  is 
substantial is seen in the premium generally paid for larger licenses where size is measured in 
license area population (―pops‖) or in frequency space (MHz), as in the 2006 AWS auction.  See 
Figure 2. Large regional licenses – D, E, F (12 licenses covering the U.S.) – generally sold for 
substantially more than did smaller licenses – A (734 licenses), B (176), C (176).
55  The F block, 
with 20 MHz, sold for more than D and E blocks, allocated 10 MHz each.  The larger B and C 
licenses sold for more than did the smallest licenses, in A.   
 
There was one important anomaly, however, in B license prices.  The B band  – 20 MHz 
allocated to 176 licenses – was less expensive than the C band – with 10 MHz distributed across 
176 licenses.  The (176) B licenses were also cheaper than the (734) A licenses. Almost all B 
licenses  were  won  by  SpectrumCo,  a  consortium  of  cable  companies  that  held  no  existing 
wireless assets.  Bazelon (2009) argues that the AWS auction, including the small slicing of 
licenses  and  the  lack  of  package  bidding,  was  efficient  given  that  an  entrant  successfully 
                                                 
53   The 700 MHz auction (No. 73) in March 2008 allowed package bids for the 12 large regional licenses, but not 
for the 1,100 other licenses.  Obviously, package bidding is most useful in rationalizing the smaller licenses.  
54   Combinatorial bids are useful whether the complementarities are weak or strong.  If the latter, non -combination 
auctions may result in severe aggregation risk, but market trading (including transactions in post -auction secondary 
markets) is likely to piece together efficiently-sized rights bundles.  If the former, transactions costs may outweigh 
gains of reassembly, and inefficiently-configured packages may persist.  
55   License prices are generally quoted in $price/MHz/pop, a convention we follow here. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 21 
acquired 20 MHz of national coverage at a price of $2.4 billion – saving $1 billion to $1.5 billion 
versus what the other two largest auction winners (T-Mobile and Verizon) paid.  That was a 
remarkable outcome (Bazelon 2009).   Bulow, Levin and Milgrom (2009) detail the bidding 
strategy of SpectrumCo as highly successful, particularly its early use of a nine-increment jump 
bid (the largest allowed under the AWS rules). From a social standpoint, however, such price 
differentials suggest that the input market has yet to reflect competitive equilibrium.  Auction 
rules should invite bidders to purchase productive assets at competitive prices, not hire expensive 








Two basic policy reforms would promote further progress.  The first, discussed above, 
would provide for package bidding in auctions.  The second entails further liberalization of 
spectrum use, allowing market access  – via liberal licenses -- to more bandwidth.  This would 
increase market liquidity, eliminating price differentials.  Engorging the supply side would, of 
course,  extend  productive  opportunities  and  liquefy  capital  markets  where  wireless  service 
providers  shop  for  spectrum  inputs  (Kwerel  and  Williams  2002).    We  discuss  the  general 
efficiencies of this approach below. 
 
4.  Under-allocation of Radio Spectrum Ownership Rights 
 
                                                 
56  A disclosure may be of interest:  Coleman Bazelon, Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom, Thomas 
Hazlett and David Porter all served as consultants to SpectrumCo. 
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  License auctions do not reform the underlying resource allocation system.  Hence, they 
do not solve the essential social coordination problem confronted in Coase (1959): how to make 
most efficient use of radio spectrum.  That is because the rights auctioned by regulators are yet 
created by administrative allocation, the state property regime imposed by policy makers on the 
premise that ―the invisible resource‖ (Levin 1971)
57 did not admit to private ownership.  
 
  The general liberalization of spectrum property rights is the more ambitious public policy 
enterprise.  While it has witnessed less decisive adoption than auctions, it has achieved more far-
reaching success in economic welfare terms.   As in other countries, the FCC has afforded wide 
discretion – what it calls ―flexible use‖ – to licensees in particular cases, most notably in mobile 
telecommunications service licenses (Kwerel and Williams 2002; Hazlett and Spitzer 2006).
58  
This has proven a powerful ―proof of concept‖ for spectrum property rights, Coase‘s principal 
normative recommendation.  Exclusive ownership rights have been implemented without major 
strain (indeed, barely any institutional notice) on the regulatory system.  Competitive licensees, 
endowed with control of bandwidth, have coordinated complex economic activities that would 
be  less  efficiently  supplied  under  alternative  rules,  ushering  in  waves  of  welfare-enhancing 
investment and innovation.  There is no serious opposition to the proposition that ―flexible use‖ 
has offered substantial improvements over the ―command and control‖ mechanisms of the state 
property regime (Hatfield and Weiser 2006; Faulhaber 2006; Weiser 2008).
59   
 
  Exclusive ownership rights enable spectrum markets to allocate bandwidth.  Important 
efficiency conditions are revealed.  Trades are commonly made in bundled form, combining 
airwave  access  with  netw ork  services.
60  Wireless  carriers  retain  integrated  control  over 
bandwidth  and  complementary  communications  infrastructure.    Resources  are  nonetheless 
shared, intensely.  A mobile phone network will sell bundled access to millions of subscribers, 
dozens  of  wireless  service  retailers  (such  as  virtual  network  operators),  and  thousands  of 
application providers.  These latter may contract directly with the network (as when customers of 
Amazon download books on their Kindles, using the Sprint network but paying Amazon) or via 
vendors setting up their own wireless platforms (as when 85,000 Apple App Store applications 
come onto iPhones accessing the AT&T network via a contract with Apple) (Hazlett 2011).  
 
  Administrative allocation yet imposes artificial scarcity.  No more than about 12% of the 
total bandwidth under 3.5 GHz (the most valuable frequencies) is thusly allocated in the U.S.
61  
                                                 
57  The late Prof. Levin‘s work is cited for its apt phrase, not for the analytical errors made by regulators – and 
corrected by both Coase and Levin.    
58   The alert reader will note the irony in speaking of ―flexible use‖ in the context of licenses crafted to provide a 
specific set of services (like ―cellular telecommunications‖).  The Coasean path would lead to ―spectrum licenses.‖   
59   Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, Federal Communications Commission, REPORT 11– 
17 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf..  
60   Of course, ‗raw spectrum‘ changes hands in the form of license sales, secondary market activity that has long 
existed.  Once networks are constructed, however, the ubiquitous business model is to retain spectrum control under 
one organizational roof, and share bandwidth by selling bundled access rights.   
61   According to a survey of OECD members by the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association 
(Summer 2009), the U.S. has authorized 409 MHz for use by wireless carriers.  (Of this, 142 MHz were  allocated to 
licenses sold in 2006 and 2008, and the bandwidth has not yet been deployed.  The AWS licenses auctioned in 2006 
have incumbent clearing operations which continue to delay new mobile deployments.)  This constitutes, 11.6% of 
the prime bandwidth  under  3.5  GHz.    Only  50  MHz  was  identified  as  being  ―in  the  pipeline‖  for  new  FCC 
authorizations.   Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 23 
Since  the  advent  of  auctions,  which  began  with  so-called  second  generation  (2G)  cellular 
licenses  in  the  mid-1990s,  further  allocations  have  been  slow.  In  the  early  2000s,  the  FCC 
slowed the release of mobile licensed spectrum – 3G licenses – in favor of additional unlicensed 
bandwidth  (Werbach  2004).  The  Bush  Administration  explicitly  delayed  additional  mobile 
license auctions in early 2001 on the grounds that such delays would be a ―win win.‖
62  The dual 
gains  came  from  helping  wireless  carriers,  which  claimed  that  they  were  then  facing  an 
economic downturn and did not need more bandwidth, and government coffers, which were 
estimated to receive higher revenues if sales were pushed back several years.  Missing from this 
starving man theory of restaurant management (the customers will pay more if you wait until 
they‘re really hungry) was any consideration of consumer welfare.  Despite the explosive growth 
in wireless services and burgeoning demand for spectrum inputs by carriers, the period 1996 
through 2005 saw the release of no new bandwidth for mobile services, constraining network 
expansion, as reflected in the dearth of auction revenues  generated during these  years.  See 
Figure 3. 
 





  Moreover, U.S. regulators have reversed course on liberalization.  For the 700 MHz 
licenses, allocated UHF TV frequencies being abandoned b y broadcasters with the analog 
switch-off (completed June 2009), the FCC conditioned different regulatory regimes.  Licenses 
sold at auction were embedded with mandates to give priority to public safety communications 
traffic, or to provide ―open access‖ for all wireless devices and applications.  These licenses 
received sharply lower bids than licenses sold without such restrictions; indeed, the national ―D‖ 
license, allocated 10 MHz, received no bid at or above the reserve price, such that the bandwidth 
                                                 
62   ―To the industry‘s relief, FCC Chairman Michael Powell, with the blessing of Secretary of Commerce Donald 
Evans, recently halted a mandate from former President Clinton that would have required all government branches 
to identify suitable 3G spectrum by July 30 of this year and auction it off by September 2002.‖  Lynette Luna, 
Spectrum Quandary Puts 3G At Risk, TELEPHONY ONLINE (July 23, 2001).  See also, Patrick Ross, Bush Wants to 
Delay Airwave Auction, CNET NEWS.COM (April 9, 2001). 
63  Source: FCC (see Appendix 1).  Auction 5 (PCS C) produced bids that largely went uncollected.  Auction 35 
(PCS C re-auction) bids went entirely uncollected. Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 24 
continues  to  lie  idle.    The  compatibility  of  old-style  FCC  micro-management  with  license 
auctions  was  theoretically  clear,  and  well  stated  in  Coase  (1959).    But  benefits  of  market 
allocation are lost.    
 
  Ironically, given their common normative roots, competitive bidding for licenses may 
undermine spectrum liberalization.  By eliminating the rents awarded to new licensees, auctions 
tend to reduce the political demand for bandwidth supplements.  Lacking more fundamental 
reforms in the system of spectrum allocation, license auctions may make the regulatory regime 
even more conservative.   
 
  a.  Where‘s the Bandwidth?   
 
This tension flows from the regulator‘s structurally passive role in spectrum allocation, 
coupled  with  the  bi-level  nature  of  the  regulatory  process.    First,  spectrum  allocations  are 
generally  triggered  by  one  or  more  interested  parties  formally  requesting  that  the  FCC 
accommodate new services.  Second, if the FCC acts, entrants must then obtain licenses created 
in the allocation.  There are risks of failure at either level; unless both the allocation and the 
license are obtained, the entrant wastes any investment in promoting regulatory change.
64   
 
Under the comparative hearing system, there was an implicit property right awarded to 
lobbyists for new allocations: if the Commission was persuaded to allocate spectrum for a new 
service, those who had petitioned the agency to achieve this policy would likely stand first in 
line, ahead of rival license applicants.  With the switch to auctions, the queue is eliminated.  The 
returns to innovation are thereby reduced.  That part of the innovation that is specific to 
developing a new FCC allocation receives no payment.  Competitors will free ride on the 
innovator‘s efforts, having equal standing in the auction. 
 
License auctions are designed to eliminate wasteful rent seeking, a useful contribution.  
But  they  may  simultaneously  reduce  incentives  for  productive  rent  seeking.
65  This lessens 
pressure for spectrum allocations.  The strategy of liberalization, of which license auctions are a 
key component, may include offsets.  The demonstration effect of market allocation of licenses 
may  itself  propel  reforms  that  generally  enabl e  more  bandwidth  to  be  used  by  market 
participants.  This may be observed in countries that have, in instituting auctions, jumped ahead 
to also reform the underlying allocation regime.
66   
 
                                                 
64   This scenario omits the possibility that the entrant seeks unlicensed spectrum, but can be easily extended to 
encompass  unlicensed  allocations,  however,  which  sharply  increased  in  the  U.S.  following  the  introduction  of 
license auctions.  This outcome was consistent with the rent seeking dynamics outlined here.  As license rents were 
taxed away in competitively bid assignments, relative returns to rent seeking for unlicensed allocations increased.  
Rent seeking (or defending) activity by incumbents strategically intending to deter competitive entry via licensed 
spectrum buttresses the effect. 
65   The importance of rent seeking for the provision of valuable public goods was articulated in Lee, (1999). 
66    In addition to the statutory reforms instituted, 1989 -1997, in Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala and El 
Salvador, the U.K. and Norway have promoted spectrum liberalization through regulatory agency actions in recent 
years.    These  policies  attempt  to  allow  private  parties  to  bid  for  spectrum,  not  simply  licenses  allo cated 
administratively on a case-by-case basis.  Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 25 
In the U.S., however, weakened pressure for new allocations, combined with political 
arguments  favoring  revenue  maximization,  produced  a  spectrum  drought,  1997-2006.    The 
spectrum lags did not  go unnoticed; Congress  mandated additional auctions, using TV band 
spectrum, beginning in 2000.  But the FCC, lobbied by incumbent carriers to delay new license 
sales, postponed these  auctions.   The Bush Administration joined this  dirigiste campaign in 
2001.  As Gerald Faulhaber wrote in 2006: 
 
The sorry result is that cellular companies are straining within their bandwidth 
restrictions  and are unable to  obtain new bandwidth  to  expand their business.  
Meanwhile, large amounts of bandwidth are currently occupied by VHF and UHF 
television  broadcasters,  even  as  the  audience  for  broadcast-delivered  TV 
shrinks… (Faulhaber 2006, p. 262).
 
 
When the de facto ban on bandwidth was lifted, the Sept. 2006 auction of AWS licenses 
(allocated 90 MHz) and the March 2008 sale of 700 MHz licenses (allocated 52 MHz of UHF 
TV frequencies) sold to hungry spectrum consumers who spent lavishly.  Some $33 billion in 
receipts was received by the U.S. Government – 62% of the total revenues collected from July 
1994. 
 
  One consequence of the policy-imposed, decade-long spectrum  drought  period was  a 
merger wave.  In 2004, there were six major nationwide carriers: Verizon, Cingular, AT&T 
Wireless, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Nextel.  In 2004-05, however, Cingular (a joint venture of SBC 
and BellSouth) acquired AT&T Wireless for $41 billion, while Sprint bought Nextel for $35 
billion.  When the dust settled, four national carriers remained.  The two combinations were both 
driven, in large part, by a demand to access additional bandwidth; both networks launched 3G 
upgrades post-merger.
67  T-Mobile, which did not acquire additional significant spectrum during 
the drought  period,  had  to  delay  its  3G services
68  until  2008,  when  its  newly  purchased 
bandwidth – it was the largest winning bidder in the AWS auction, spending $4.2 billion on 




  The current spectrum holdings of the four national carriers are seen in Figure 4.  By 
aggregating  licenses,  network  operators  have  assembled  bandwidth  blocks  of  consistent  size 
(and, although not shown, frequencies).  The relentlessness of market incentives masks a good 
deal  of inefficiency.  Thousands  of secondary  market  transactions  have contributed to  these 
holdings, as have many FCC auctions.  Firms have devoted much energy, not to mention tens of 
                                                 
67   ―Cingular Wireless, the nation's largest cellphone service provider, announced plans yesterday to upgrade its 
high-speed data network, allowing faster downloads than are now available on many home broadband connections. 
The upgrade will start at the end of 2005, and the network will be in place nationwide by 2006, Cingular said. .. In 
October, Cingular Wireless closed its acquisition of AT&T Wireless, creating the nation's largest wireless company 
with 47 million subscribers. Cingular said the acquisition gave it the additional radio spectrum necessary to deploy 
the high-speed network.‖  Matt Richtel, Cingular to Upgrade Data Network, NY TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004).   
68   ―T-Mobile USA Inc. continues to lag behind its competitors in offering wide-area next-generation services, as 
the carrier is still working on deploying EDGE services. The carrier also has stated it will be at least two years 
before it has enough spectrum capacity to launch a UMTS-based network.‖  Dan Meyer, Verizon expands EV-DO, 
Cingular says it's under no pressure to match speed, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (July 4, 2005). 
69   Laurie Sullivan, T-Mobile Plans Major Cellular Upgrade To 3G, INFORMATION WEEK (Oct. 16, 2006). Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 26 
billions of dollars of investment capital, to acquiring these asset portfolios.  Milgrom criticizes 
the laissez-faire attitude that initial assignments do not matter much, so long as the rights are ―in 
the market‖ (Milgrom 2004, p. 19-21). It is a point worth making; institutions should be shaped 
to reduce such social expense.  But, again, Coasean symmetry is called for.  If auctions tend to 
delay the release of additional bandwidth to market participants, gains from competitive bidding 
for licenses can be swamped by the costs of idle spectrum.  The slow flow of spectrum during 
the license auction period in  the U.S.  is  surely a cause  for concern.   The remedy is  not  in 
abandoning  auctions,  but  in  structural  reforms  that  push  the  auction  more  deeply  into  the 
spectrum allocation function.   
 




  B.  De-liberalization. 
 
  Driven  both  by  an  intellectual  consensus  among  economists
71  and social demands to 
adopt more efficient license distributions,
72  U.S. spectrum allocation underwent a quiet but 
striking period of deregulatory reform, 1975 -2000.  During that time private satellites were 
authorized, cable TV operators were allowed to compete with broadcasters, content rules were 
relaxed for radio and  TV stations, satellite TV and radio operators were licensed, and cellular 
and PCS licenses were issued.   Spectrum policy was fundamentally altered in the liberalization 
of mobile licenses; initially, cellular operators were mandated to provide a particular service with 
a given (analog) technology, and the location of transmission facilities was fixed in the license.   
 
                                                 
70  Source: Blair Levin, What 700 MHz Winners Can Do With Their Spectrum, Stifel Nicolas (April 15, 2008), 4.  
T=AT&T; VZ=Verizon; S=Sprint. 
71   See Gregory L. Rosston et al.,  Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, Comment submitted to the Federal 
Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 00-230 (Feb. 7, 2001). 
72   For theoretical and empirical discussions of how spectrum policy has been reformed, see Hazlett (2001, 1998). Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 27 
  By  the  time  PCS  permits  were  allocated  in  1995,  operators  could  select  their  own 
(digital) technology, provide voice, data, or video services, and had wide latitude in choice of 
business models.  Disparate licenses – cellular, SMR, PCS – were unified under the CMRS 
(Commercial  Mobile  Radio  Service)  regime,  allowing  flexibility  to  licensees  and  promoting 
competition  across  otherwise  disparate  markets.    The  policy  objective  shifted  from  detailed 
specification of technology, equipment, network architecture, and service, to an effort to ―license 
spectrum.‖  
 
  Yet the traditional administrative system for allocating spectrum rights remained in place.   
And in recent years the political equilibrium at the FCC has retreated, slowing or reversing the 
path to liberal licenses.  Important policies that resulted include the allocation of a 50 MHz 
―WiMax‖ band (3650-3700 MHz) for unlicensed rather than licensed use in 2005; the 700 MHz 
C block ―open access‖ rules adopted in 2007; the 700 MHz D block ―public safety‖ license plan 
adopted in 2007; and the TV band ―white spaces‖ allocation for unlicensed devices (sharing the 
294 MHz of ―DTV spectrum‖) in 2008.    
 
·  3650-3700 MHz.  A swath of 50 MHz adjacent to 3.5 GHz, the most popular international 
band for emerging WiMax services,  was  set  aside for unlicensed devices  in  a 2005 
Order.  The FCC rejected a proposal from Intel and Alvarion (ironically, two of the 
largest  manufacturing  firms  in  the  unlicensed  device  space)  to  largely  allocate  the 
bandwidth to liberal licenses.   Instead, it issued non-exclusive use rights while requiring 
a registration system (to identify the location of transmissions) for users and mandating 
that operators adopt reasonable ―contention-based protocols‖ to mitigate interference.  
This approach shifts the task of devising and regulating spectrum sharing etiquettes from 
profit-maximizing firms to the government (Brito 2007).  As of mid-2009, the band 
supplied virtually no subscriber services.
73 
 
·  700  MHz  C  License  “Open  Access”  Rules.    In  crafting  rules  for  the  licenses  to  be 
auctioned in 2008 the FCC determined that the winner of the 22 MHz C license (the 
largest in the auction) would be obligated to provide non-discriminatory network access 
for all devices and applications.
74  This mandate leaves many details unanswered; it is 
                                                 
73   Maravedis data from 2Q2009 registered 1,600 subscribers of wireless broadband services in the band, all of 
which were business customers.  In contrast, 461,000 retail customers subscribed to Clearwire, offering service on 
licensed 2.5 GHz airwaves obtained in secondary market transactions from original licensees.    
74   The C Licensee is mandated by the FCC not to: 
·  Block, degrade, or interfere with the ability of end users to download and utilize applications of their choosing on 
the licensee‘s Block C network, subject to reasonable network management.  Wireless service providers subject 
to this requirement will not be allowed to disable features or functionality in handsets where such action is not 
related  to  reasonable  network  management  and  protection,  or  compliance  with  applicable  regulatory 
requirements.  For example, providers may not ―lock‖ handsets to prevent their transfer from one system to 
another. 
·  Block Wi-Fi access, MP3 playback ringtone capability, or other services that compete  with  wireless service 
providers‘ own offerings.  
·  Exclude applications or devices solely on the basis that such applications or devices would unreasonably increase 
bandwidth demands.  
·  Impose any additional discriminatory charges (one-time or recurring) or conditions on customers who seek to use 
devices or applications outside of those provided by the licensee.  
·  Deny access to a customer‘s device solely because that device makes use of other wireless spectrum bands, such Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 28 
not clear how far prices and technologies – as distinct from Acceptable Use Policies – 
may  exclude  devices  or  applications.    Verizon  won  the  C  block,  capturing  a  60% 
discount attributed, in substantial measure, to the regulatory liability assumed.
75  If the 
discount resulted in superior retail market performance, it could well be justified.  Yet, 
as seen in the current   rivalry between RIM Blackberry, Apple iPhone, and Google 
gPhone,  platform  competitive  business  models  locate  across  an  ―open–closed‖ 
continuum  (Hazlett  2011)    It  is  not  the  case  that  ―open‖  access  models  invariably 
outperform; it is clearly the case that some ―closed‖ platforms drive rivalry and deliver 
consumer  benefits.    Categorical  restrictions  by  regulators  diminish  rivalry,  tax  the 
innovative  process,  and  foreclose  valuable  options.    This  approach  re-institutes  the 
license rigidities of traditional spectrum regulation. 
 
·  700 MHz D Block.  The FCC imposed expensive obligations on the 10 MHz D license, 
requiring  the  winning  bidder  to  give  priority  access  to  public  safety  agencies  (fire, 
police, emergency  ‗first responders‘) in  a hybrid (commercial/public  safety)  wireless 
network.    Extensive  build-out  obligations  were  also  imposed,  requiring  network 
coverage of 75% of U.S. population by 2013, 95% by 2016 and 99.3% by 2019.  No bid 
exceeded the reserve price of $1.3 billion.  At the mean price/MHz-pop for A, B, C, and 
E licenses, D would have generated $3.9 billion.  Instead, 10 MHz lies dormant.     
 
 
  In the 700 MHz license auction concluded in March 2008, the underlying spectrum was 
virtually identical across properties.
76   Yet price variances were very large.  See Table 3.  The C 
block sold for 29% of the adjusted price of the B block despite the aggregation premium on the 
larger-bandwidth C licenses.  The C licenses, at B prices, would have cost Verizon nearly $16.6 
billion -- $11.8 billion more.  Of course, the D license did not sell, even at a reserve price one -
third of the average obtained for the other licenses.  This is evidence that regulatory rules and 
spectrum allocation procedures continue to distort markets.  Bandwidth continues to be allocated 
not to where consumers desire it to be used, but where administrative mechanisms steer it.
77   
   
                                                                                                                                                             
as cellular or PCS spectrum. 
Bingham Law firm summary (Aug. 15, 2007); http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=5492.  
75    Verizon paid $4.7 billion for licenses allocated 22 MHz of nationwide spectrum; at the mean prices for the other 
comparable licenses sold in the auction (the A and B licenses also having paired spectrum) it would have paid $11.8 
billion, or 2.5 times as much. 
76   Boundary conditions were a bit different.  The A licenses were allocated spectrum adjacent to TV Channel 51, 
e.g., where digital television broadcasts would cause some conflicts in (relatively few) markets where such TV 
stations broadcast.  Another difference was that the E license was offered as a single ―block‖ and not as ―paired‖ 
spectrum.  This, however, reflects administrative discretion. 
77   In placing ―open access‖ requirements on the C license, FCC policy makers effectively allocated 
spectrum for the benefit of application providers like Google that lobbied for the rules.  By allowing such 
firms  to  direct  resources without  absorbing  the  costs  of  the  resulting  allocation,  free  rider  problems 
emerge.  See Brusco, et al. (2009).  Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 29 
 
 
Table 3.  Average Prices for Different Licenses in 700 MHz Auction (March 2008) 
 
Block  Net Winning Bids ($)  MHz * Pops  $/MHz/pop 
A  3,875,663,800  3,419,018,088  1.13 
B  9,068,382,850  3,419,018,088  2.65 
C  4,746,691,000  6,283,649,790  0.76 
E  1,266,844,500  1,713,722,670  0.74 
TOTAL  18,957,582,150  14,833,358,892  1.28 
Source: Blair Levin, Special Focus: The Wireless World After 700 MHz, Stifel Nicolas (March, 2008), p. 4.   
 
  The degree to which the regulatory system distorts spectrum values is suggested in Figure 
5, showing the price (adjusted for MHz and population in the licensed areas) paid across U.S. 
auctions divided by the mean price paid across all auctions.
78 CMRS licenses, embedding a 
(mostly) homogeneous set of licensee property rights, are denoted, and exhibit less variance than 
the non-CMRS sample.  See also Table 4.  Although economic factors, including overall market 
conditions and frequency location, alter bids over time, the extreme variance in FCC license 
prices is difficult to explain by changing economic circumstances alone.  The distinct nature of 
the  rights  granted  in  different  licenses,  the  manner  in  which  spectrum  i s  divvied  up  (or 
channelized), and the credits extended to certain auction participants have served to create large 
price variance.  
 
FIG.  5.  PRICE/MHZ/POP ACROSS U.S. LICENSE AUCTIONS, 1994-2008 
 
 
    
                                                 
78   There have been 72 FCC auctions; the mean price per MHz-pop (equally weighted across auctions) is 23.17¢.  Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 30 
 
 
Table 4.  FCC License Auction Prices: Means and Standard Deviations  
 
  All Auctions  CMRS Auctions  Non-CMRS Auctions 
Mean Price per MHz ($)  0.46  1.16  0.33 
Std. Dev. ($)  1.51  1.19  1.54 
 
  
Certain licenses have been embedded with broad, flexible spectrum use rights that permit 
licensees to determine services, business models, and technologies. In general, licenses used for 
mobile voice and data services have been liberally endowed (Kwerel and Williams 2002).  The 
Coasean vision of functioning, efficient spectrum markets are thereby supported – and observed.  
Most spectrum, however, continues to be allocated in highly restrictive ways, either bottled up in 
little used government allocations or dedicated to traditional licenses granting sharply truncated 
spectrum property rights.   
 
That regulators seek to promote different services with different licenses constitutes an 
industrial policy Gerald Faulhaber and David Farber dub ―GOSPLAN‖ (Faulhaber 2006, p. 265).  
Satellite radio licenses, for example, permit only national broadcasts; targeted, localized content 
is prohibited (to protect terrestrial radio stations).  Satellite telephone operators are permitted to 
provide ―ancillary terrestrial‖ mobile services only to augment satellite phone service, despite the 
fact that ―land mobile‖ is likely to be the most efficient use of the band.   Guard bands in 700 
MHz frequencies have been heavily regulated, with licensees permitted only to operate on a 
common  carriage  model  imposed  by  the  Commission.    The  rules  have  proven  unworkable, 
destroying the value of otherwise productive frequencies (Rosston 2003).  
 
  License  auctions  appear  to  have  exacerbated  the  tendency  of  spectrum  misallocation 
under the regulatory regime, but the hypothesis is testable.  The simpler point made here is that 
competitive bidding for licenses is easily compatible with a policy regime in which spectrum is 
allocated as state property.  Absent more fundamental reforms, the ―price system‖ will continue 
to be stymied in its effort to efficiently allocate radio spectrum. 




  When  Ronald  Coase  began  his  investigation  of  the  regulation  of  radio  waves,  the 
consensus view was that spillovers in the use of a resource disqualified markets as the efficient 
form of social organization.   Only the unified control exerted by an administrative agency of the 
state could take into account the conflicts between rival users.  Regulators, judges and industry 
experts agreed.   
 
  Coase wondered why the coordination commonly seen in market transactions would fail 
to obtain.  Using the assumptions of prevailing economic models, he reasoned that they would 
not: if private actors were as perfectly informed as were government regulators, they would set 
ownership rules so as to maximize the value of output, sharing the gains.  When the obscuring 
assumption of perfect information was relaxed, then the source of coordination problems became 
clear:  ownership  rights  were  not  sufficiently  established  to  permit  the  cooperation  routinely 
exhibited elsewhere in the economy. 
 
Coase  (1959)  is  best  known  as  an  advocacy  essay  promoting  FCC  license  auctions.  
Derided  at  first,  the  policy  suggestion  was  eventually  adopted  in  the  U.S.  by  congressional 
statute in 1993.  Competitive bidding commenced the following year, capturing about $52 billion 
in federal receipts in the years since.  By rule of thumb, Coase‘s reform has generated at least 
$17 billion in efficiency gains (via reductions in tax distortions), placing him in the company of 
those  rare  scholars  who  can  easily  document  the  positive  net  social  value  of  their  research 
agenda.   
 
Yet this seminal paper was actually not a polemic, and spectrum auctions not its principal 
legacy.  What Coase fundamentally contributed was a symmetric analysis of property regime 
choices, explaining how the costs of the ―price system‖ were real, but that so were the costs of 
any alternative.  The administrative allocation system, by restricting productive activities, was 
also  costly,  and  yet  revealed  none  of  the  price  information  that  would  come  from  property 
owners pursuing gains from trade.  Lacking such data, resource allocation would be an exercise 
in the dark. 
 
  Coase  argued  for  analytical  symmetry  on  logical  grounds,  and  then  expressed  an 
expectation  that  private  property  would  outperform  state  property  given  the  rich  empirical 
history of competing systems.  He was open to correction; he, in fact, had little spectrum market 
evidence to  distinguish  the most efficient path.  But the  ―invisible hand‖  generally worked.   
Why not here?  He became convinced that the general case would obtain in the special case of 
radio  spectrum  when  the  arguments  for  administrative  control  were  made.    They  were 
―incredibly feeble,‖ and easily refuted by a law student who had fortuitously read Abba Lerner as 
an undergraduate (Coase 1993, p. 249).
 
   
  Thanks  to  changing  technologies,  evolving  political  equilibria,  and  the  intellectual 
consensus  that  Coase  fundamentally  reshaped,  policy  makers  around  the  globe  have  begun 
treating  the  spectrum  allocated  to  mobile  telecommunications  licenses  as  de  facto  private 
property.  Decades of experience with comparative spectrum ownership institutions are now Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 32 
available for observation.   The liberalization of private property rights has yielded extremely 
large social gains, permitting complex market structures to develop.  No other form of spectrum 
allocation, including the ―command and control‖ once thought necessary to avoid tragedy of the 
commons or the ―spectrum commons‖ recently heralded as the obsolescence of Coasean property 
rights, supports such productive social coordination.  
 
  In this environment, new and interesting problems have appeared.  Foremost among them 
is the apparent conflict between license auctions and efficiency in spectrum allocation.  Where 
the price system is instituted to assign rights crafted under a non-market system, claimants bid 
competitively and rents are captured by the state.  Rights assignments are more efficient, but 
dynamic pressure for the creation of new rights is reduced.  Eliminating wasteful rent seeking, 
and the misallocations designed to attract it, saves society resources.  But a good measure of 
productive rent seeking has been eliminated, as well.  Spectrum policy makers may become less 
subject to pressures for market entry.   
 
  While  market  allocation  of  radio  spectrum,  tried  and  tested,  generally  out-performs 
administrative  allocation,  U.S.  policy  makers  have  remained  in  control  of  new  spectrum 
allocations and may have become even more conservative.   Consumers, innovators, and a host 
of industries visibly benefit from liberalization and would further gain from its extension.  The 
rivalry between these competing political forces will yet determine whether the disruptive clarity 
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APPENDIX 1.  FCC WIRELESS LICENSE AUCTIONS 
 






(Net Bids - $)  Total MHz 
Price per MHz-
Pop 
1  Nationwide Narrowband PCS  7/25/1994 - 7/29/1994  5  10  650,306,674  0.7875  3.158716 
2  Interactive Video & Data Services   7/28/1994 - 7/29/1994  2  594  213,892,375  1  0.81816 
3  Regional Narrowband PCS  10/26/1994 - 11/8/1994  9  130  392,706,797  0.45  10.68398 
4  Broadband PCS A & B   12/5/1994 - 3/13/1995  60  99  7,721,184,171  60  0.487617 
5  Broadband PCS C   12/18/1995 - 5/6/1996  83  493  10,071,708,842  30  1.260233 
6  Multipoint/Multichannel Distr.Services  11/13/1995 - 3/28/1996  75  493  216,239,603  78  0.886594 
7  900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio   12/5/1995 - 4/15/1996  79  1020  204,267,144  10  0.077401 
8  Direct Broadcast Satellite 110°  1/24/1996 - 1/25/1996  1.5  1  682,500,000  N/a  N/a 
9  Direct Broadcast Satellite 148°  1/25/1996 - 1/26/1996  1.5  1  52,295,000  500  0.000393 
10  Broadband PCS C (Re-auction)  7/3/1996 - 7/16/1996  8  18  904,607,467  30  0.11319 
11  Broadband PCS D, E, F  8/29/1996 - 1/14/1997  85  1472(a)  2,517,439,565  30  0.312032 
12  Cellular Unserved  1/13/1997 - 1/21/1997  6  14  1,842,533  N/a  N/a 
14  Wireless Communications Service   4/15/1997 - 4/25/1997  9  126(b)  13,638,940  30  0.001691 
15  Digital Audio Radio Service  4/1/1997 - 4/2/1997  2  2  173,234,888  25  0.025767 
16  800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio   10/28/1997 - 12/8/1997  27  524  96,232,060  10  0.035783 
17  Local Multipoint Distribution System   2/18/1998 - 3/25/1998  26  864  578,663,029  1300  0.00164 
18  220 MHz  9/15/1998 - 10/22/1998  26  693  21,650,301  N/a  N/a 
20  VHF Public Coast  12/3/1998 - 12/14/1998  8  26(c)  7,459,200  0.05  0.549709 
21  Location and Monitoring Service  2/23/1999 - 3/5/1999  9  289  3,438,294  14  0.000897 
22  Block Broadband PCS C, D, E, F  3/23/1999 - 4/15/1999  17  302(d)  412,840,945  50  0.030153 
23  LMDS Re-auction  4/27/1999 - 5/12/1999  12  161  45,064,450  1300  0.000127 
24  220 MHz   6/8/1999 - 6-30-1999  17  222  1,924,950  1.55  0.004535 
25  Closed Broadcast  9/28/1999 - 10/8/1999  9  115  57,820,350  N/a  N/a 
27  Broadcast Auction   10/6/1999 - 10/8/1999  3  1  172,250  0.2  0.003145 
26  929 & 931 MHz Paging Service  2/24/2000 - 3/2/2000  6  985  4,122,500  2  0.007324 
28  Broadcast Auction   3/21/2000 - 3/24/2000  4  2  1,210,000  12  0.000358 
30  39 GHz  4/12/2000 - 5/8/2000  19  2173  410,649,085  1400  0.001042 
80  Blanco Texas Broadcast  7/12/2000 - 7/14/2000  3  1  18,798,000  N/a  N/a 
33  Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands  9/6/2000 - 9/21/2000  12  96  519,892,575  6  0.307896 
34  800 MHz SMR General Category  8/16/2000 - 9/1/2000  13  1030  319,451,810  1293.8  0.000877 
36  800 MHz SMR Lower 80 Channels   11/1/2000 - 12/5/2000  22  2800  28,978,385  4  4.37 
35  C & F Block Broadband PCS  12/12/2000 - 1/26/2001  24  422  16,857,046,150  70  0.845567 
38  Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands (2001)  2/13/2001 - 2/21/2001  6  8  20,961,500  6  0.012267 
39  VHF Public Coast Location Monitoring   6/6/2001 - 6/13/2001  6  217  1,144,755  14.05  0.000286 
40  Paging  10/30/2001 - 12/5/2001  24  5323  12,897,127  2.12  0.021361 
41  Narrowband PCS  10/3/2001 - 10/16/2001  8  317  8,285,036  1.8625  0.015619 
42  Multiple Address Systems Spectrum  11/14/2001 - 11/27/2001  8  878(e)  1,202,725  0.825  0.005119 
43  Mult-Radio Service  1/10/2002 - 1/17/2002  6  27(f)  1,548,225  30.5  0.000176 
82  New Analog Television Stations  2/5/2002 - 2/13/2002  5  4  5,025,250  24  0.000726 
44  Lower 700 MHz Band (2002)  8/27/2002 - 9/18/2002  16  484  88,651,630  18  0.017079 
45  Cellular RSA  5/29/2002 - 6/4/2002  5  3  15,871,000  N/a  N/a 
32  New AM Broadcast Stations  12/10/2002 - 12/12/2002  3  3  1,520,375  0.03  0.175744 
46  1670-1675 MHz Nationwide License  4/30/2003  1  1  12,628,000  5  0.008685 
48  Lower and Upper Paging Bands  5/13/2003 - 5/28/2003  11  2832  2,445,608  N/a  N/a 
49  Lower 700 MHz Band (2003)  5/28/2003 - 6/13/2003  13  251  56,815,960  18  0.010854 
54  Closed Broadcast (2003)  7/23/2003 - 7/29/2003  5  4  4,657,600  N/a  N/a 
50  Narrowband PCS (2003)  9/24/2003 - 9/29/2003  4  48  428,709  0.6625  0.002225 
51  Regional Narrowband (PCS) (2003)  9/24/2003 - 9/25/2003  2  5  134,250  0.125  0.003693 Hazlett, Porter and Smith:  Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase   page 36 
52  Direct Broadcast Satellite Service  7/14/2004  1  3  12,200,000  N/a  N/a 
53  Multichannel Video Distribution & Data   1/14/2004 - 1/27/2004  9  192  118,721,835  96000  4.21E-06 
55  900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio   2/11/2004 - 2/25/2004  10  55  4,861,020  5  0.003311 
56  24 GHz Service  7/28/2004  1  7  216,050  400  1.84E-06 
57  Automated Maritime Telecom. System  9/15/2004  1  10  1,057,365  2  0.0018 
37  FM Broadcast  11/3/2004 - 11/23/2004  14  258  147,876,075  51.6  0.009759 
58  Broadband PCS (re-auction)  1/26/2005 - 2/15/2005  15  217  2,043,230,450  120  0.057444 
59  Multiple Address Systems Spectrum  4/26/2005 - 5/18/2005  17  2223  3,865,515  0.7  0.01863 
60  Lower 700 MHz Band  7/20/2005 - 7/26/2005  5  5  305,155  12  8.58E-05 
61  Automated Maritime Telecom. System   8/3/2005 - 8/17/2005  11  10  7,094,350  2  0.011967 
81  Low Power Television (LPTV)  9/14/2005 - 9/26/2005  9  90  834,600  540  5.21E-06 
63  Multichannel Video Distribution & Data   12/7/2005  1  22  133,160  11000  4.08E-08 
62  FM Broadcast (2006)  1/12/2006 - 1/31/2006  13  163  54,259,600  32.6  0.005559 
64  Full Power TV Construction Permits  3/15/2006 - 3/20/2006  4  10  23,367,850  60  0.001301 
65  800 MHz Air-Ground Radiotelephone   5/10/2006 - 6/2/2006  15  2  38,339,000  N/a  N/a 
66  Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1)  8/9/2006 - 9/18/2006  28  1087  13,700,267,150  90  0.508437 
68  FM Broadcast (1/2007)  1/10/2007 - 1/17/2007  5  9  3,264,250  1.8  0.006012 
69  1.4 GHz Bands  2/7/2007 - 3/8/2007  21  64  123,599,000  8  0.051223 
70  FM Broadcast (3/2007)  3/7/2007 - 3/26/2007  14  111  21,301,175  22.2  0.003181 
71  Broadband PCS (2007)  5/16/2007 - 5/21/2007  4  33  13,932,150  120  0.000385 
72  220 MHz  6/20/2007 - 6/26/2007  5  76  185,416  0.25  0.002459 
73  700 MHz Band  1/24/2008 - 3/18/2008  38  1090(g)  18,957,582,150  52  1.199004 
77  Closed Cellular Unserved  6/17/2008  1  1  25,002  N/A  N/a 
78  AWS-1 & Broadband PCS  8/13/2008 - 8/20/2008  6  53  21,276,850  165  0.000424 
85  LPTV & TV Translator Digital Channels  11/5/2008 - 11/10/2008  4  30  134,725  180  2.46E-06 
                       
  Average auction length    14.49         
  Average Price per MHz-pop            0.231747 
  Total Licenses      27,484       
  Total Winning Bids        77,998,345,602    
  Total Revenue Collected        52,621,436,577    
  Uncollected Revenue        25,376,909,025    
  Percent of High Bids Uncollected  32.54           
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